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Abstract 
In this paper we empirically test the dependence of the Russian stock market on the world 
stock market, world oil prices and Russian political and economic news during the period 
2001-2010. We find that oil prices are not significant after 2006, the Japan stock index is 
significant over the whole period, since it is the nearest market index in terms of closing time 
to the Russian stock index. We find that political news like Yukos arrests or news on the 
Georgian war have a short term impact, since there are many other shocks, the structural 
instability of the Russian financial market is confirmed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the mass-media and amongst Russian financial analysts one can often find statements like “The 
Russian stock market is determined by the US stock market”, “The Russian stock market is 
determined by oil (gas) prices”. Also statements that internal Russian political shocks (like the 
Yukos affair, Putin’s statement on Mechel, etc.) have a significant long-term impact on the Russian 
stock market. In this paper we test these assertions empirically using data from financial markets. 
There are a lot of papers studying market returns, but only a few of them study Russian 
stock market returns, integration of the Russian stock market into the international financial market, 
or the influence of political shocks on Russian stock market returns.  
The first papers to make an econometric analysis of the emerging Russian financial and 
stock market were published in 2000. Rockinger and Urga (2000) investigated the weak-form 
efficiency for markets in transition economies (including Russia), and find some evidence for the 
tendency to markets’ efficiency. Peresetsky and Ivanter (2000) studied integration of the Russian 
financial markets into the international financial market. They analyzed daily market data for the 
period  1996:05–1997:10 and came to conclusion of increasing integration of Russian and 
international financial markets during that period, which weakened approaching to the August 1998 
crisis. Also they suggested that there is global movement of the international financial market and 
when one considers correlations between daily market returns between Russian, US, Japan, 
European financial markets it is necessary to take the time lag between different markets’ closing 
times into account. Peresetsky, Turmuhambetova, Urga (2001) analyzed the risk premium of the 
Russian government bond markets using daily market data for the period 1996:09–1998:03. 
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Jalolov and Miyakoshi (2005) employed an EGARCH model using monthly data for the 
period 1995:05–2003:03. They found that the German market rather than the US market is a better 
predictor for Russian stock market monthly returns due to the closer German relations in trade and 
investment with Russia. They did not find a significant influence of oil and gas prices on Russian 
stock returns. They found that one-step prediction with the EGARCH model is not useful since it is 
worse than the random walk model prediction in terms of the root mean squared error. 
Hayo and Kutan (2005) studied Russian stock market daily returns using an asymmetric 
GARCH model with Student distribution of errors. They found that lagged values of Russian stock 
index return, S&P return, oil index return are significant in prediction of the Russian stock index 
return1. Thus the hypothesis of an efficient market was rejected. Also they analyzed the direct 
influence of news on returns and volatility of the Russian stock index. Since the Russian economy 
depends heavily on oil and gas, they take energy news as economic news and news on the Chechen 
war as political news. They have constructed three dummies for good, bad and neutral energy news 
and three corresponding dummies for the Chechen war news. They have found that all news fails to 
be significant both for explanation of returns and for volatility of returns. Only S&P shocks are 
found to be significant in the TGARCH variance equation. Negative S&P shocks increase volatility 
of the Russian stock index; positive S&P shocks decrease volatility of the Russian stock index. 
When the square of the lagged S&P return is included into the variance equation, it demonstrates a 
significant positive effect, which indicates a “direct” volatility link between the two markets. 
Anatolyev (2005) analyzed weekly stock market returns for the two periods: first 1995:01–2005:01, 
and second, after the 1998 crisis period 1999:10–2005:01. He finds that during the last years of the 
second period the influence of oil prices decreased and the influence of US indices increased. He 
finds significant variation in explanatory power of the models over subperiods. He finds that 
integration of the Russian stock market with European market is higher than with US or Asian 
markets. Also he pointed out that structural instability of the Russian financial market is not 
restricted to financial crises. The weak-form market efficiency of the Russian stock market was 
confirmed. 
Goryaev and Sonin (2005) applied a methodology similar to that in (Hayo and Kutan, 2005) 
to study the influence of positive and negative news on the Yukos affair on the Yukos stock price 
relative to the market. They found that the two dummy variables are significant for the Yukos stock 
returns during the analyzed period of 2002:01–2003:10. Also they study the influence of Yukos 
news on other companies’ stock returns. 
                                                 
1 They find that only 1-day lagged returns are significant, which is in line with a study (Eun, Shim, 1998) of relations 
between stock index returns of industrial countries. 
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Chesney, Reshetar, and Karaman (2011) suggest a non-parametric approach to event study. 
They empirically analyze the impact of terrorism on the behavior of daily stock market returns. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in three directions. First, we analyze Russian stock 
index daily returns for the period of 2000:01–2010:10, which includes the relatively stable period of 
2000–2007; second we allow model coefficients to evolve over that period estimating models in 
rolling windows, hence we can conclude on trends of dependence of Russian stock market of 
external shocks; third, we consider moving dummies to find out all possible internal shocks to 
measure their relative size in comparison with shock related to the political events (e.g. Yukos 
affair). 
 
 
2. Data and models 
 
We use daily market indices and oil prices for the period of 2000:01–2010:10 from 
Bloomberg and Datastream. We take MICEX index to represent the Russian stock index. The 
MICEX Stock Exchange is Russia’s leading stock exchange. Its proportion on the Russian on-
exchange share market is over 80%. The MICEX Stock Exchange is the largest stock exchange in 
the CIS, Eastern and Central Europe. It is the center of the formation of liquidity for Russian 
securities and the main market for international investments in shares and bonds of Russian 
companies. 
Various US, European and Asian stock indices and various oil prices were tested for the 
GARCH(1,1) model over the whole period. It happens that S&P500, NIKKEI 225 stock averages, 
and WTI2 have better explanatory power than other indices that we tested. Since the trading session 
in New York opens later than the trading session in Moscow, only previous day S&P can be used in 
regression. Trading sessions in Europe open 2 or 3 hours later than in Moscow, so also only lagged 
European index returns could be used in regression. Since the lagged US index is closer in time to 
the Russian index than the European index is, it is not surprising that the US index outperforms the 
European index in the explanation of the Russian stock index, since it absorbs more information. 
The trading session in Japan is already closed before the Moscow trading session opens. Hence the 
same day NIKKEI return can be used in regression and it includes additional information on the 
world financial market which arose after closing of the previous day’s US trading session.  
So the main equation that we estimate is 
 
0 1 1 2 1 3 1 4_  _ _ _  _t t t tR MICEX R MICEX R SNP R WTI R NIKKEIt tβ β β β β ε− − −= + + + + + ,   (1) 
                                                 
2 Crude Oil-WTI Spot Cushing (CRUDOIL, Datastream). 
 3
 4
_
Surprisingly estimates of the coefficients of equation (1) do not depend on the error model 
choice m0–m5. The variation of coefficients between different models is within one standard 
deviation with the exception of NIKKEI in OLS model m0. 
 
where the prefix R  denotes log-return, 1_ ln( / )t t tR INDEX INDEX INDEX −= , , ,MICEX SNP
,NIKKEI
t
 
 and WTI  denote MICEX,  S&P500, NIKKEI 225 stock indices and WTI oil price. We 
consider several specifications of equation (1); ε error term could be homoscedastic or follow one 
of GARCH(1,1) type processes: 
 
(m0)   2 20tσ σ=
2 2 2
0 1 1 1t t t
; 
(m1)   σ α α ε γσ− −= + +
2 2 2
0 1 1 1t t t tt
; 
(m2)   σ α α ε γσ δ− −= + + + Δ
2 2 2
0 1 1 1 ln( )t t t ttσ α α ε γσ δ− −= + + + Δ
2 2 2 2
0 1 1 2 1 1 1( ) ln( )t t t t t tind tσ α α ε α ε ε γσ δ− − − −= + + − + + Δ
2 2 2 2
0 1 1 2 1 1 1( )t t t t tind
; 
(m3)   ; 
(m4)   ; 
(m5)   σ α α ε α ε ε γσ− − − −= + + − +
( ) 1ind x = 0x < ( ) 0ind x
. 
 
Here  if  and =  if .  0x ≥ t tt deltaΔ =
1t −
 is difference in days between 
observation  and observation . Weekends and national holidays in US, Japan and Russia are 
deleted from the data, thus in total we have 2382 observations for the period 2000:01–2010:10. 
Descriptive statistics of the variables are reported in Table 1. 
t
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of daily returns and tΔ , 2000:01–2010:10 
 R_MICEX R_SNP R_WTI1 R_NIKKEI delta 
 Mean  0.000898  0.0000594  0.000404 –0.000193  1.53 
 Median  0.001660  0.000695  0.000351  0.000000  1.0 
 Maximum  0.252261  0.097743  0.212765  0.132346  12.0 
 Minimum –0.206571 –0.094695 –0.172169 –0.121110  1.0 
 Std. Dev.  0.025133  0.014005  0.026670  0.016491  1.09 
 Observations  2382  2382  2382  2382  2382 
 
 
3. Estimates of different models 
 
Specifications m2, m3, m4 take into account the hypothesis that conditional variance 2tσ  
(uncertainty of the market) increases with the time delay between two consecutive observations. 
Estimates of the equation (1) with various models m0–m5 for the error term are presented in Table 
2. 
Dependent Variable: R_MICEX m0 m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 
Variable 
 
OLS GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
+delta 
GARCH(1,1) 
+ln(delta) 
TGARCH(1,1) 
+ln(delta) 
TGARCH(1,1) 
R_MICEX(–1) –0.0925 –0.0841 –0.0810 –0.0813 –0.0802 –0.0818 
  (0.0206) (0.0210) (0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0211) (0.0211) 
R_SNP(–1) 0.1557 0.1501 0.1642 0.1614 0.1624 0.1499 
  (0.0403) (0.0321) (0.0330) (0.0331) (0.0334) (0.0324) 
R_WTI1(–1) 0.0538 0.0575 0.0555 0.0563 0.0560 0.0569 
  (0.0187) (0.0156) (0.0149) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0156) 
R_NIKKEI 0.4664 0.3215 0.2872 0.2909 0.2872 0.3177 
  (0.0331) (0.0205) (0.0235) (0.0230) (0.0232) (0.0211) 
Variance             
RESID(–1)^2  0.1207 0.1297 0.1283 0.0928 0.0904 
    (0.0098) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0131) (0.0126) 
RESID(–1)^2*(RESID(–1)<0)     0.0599 0.0478 
          (0.0149) (0.0143) 
GARCH(–1)   0.8583 0.8505 0.8500 0.8489 0.8597 
    (0.0107) (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0123) (0.0109) 
delta   3.50E–05    
      (0.45E–05)       
ln(delta)    8.39E–05 8.67E–05  
        (0.98E–05) (0.97E–05)   
Log likelihood 5549.2 5958.4 5988.8 5982.8 5987.4 5961.6 
R2 0.123 0.113 0.109 0.110 0.110 0.113 
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*) All coefficients are significant at 1% level. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Estimates of constants in main and in variance equations are not presented in the 
table. 
Table 2. Estimates of equation (1) with error specifications m0–m5 in the period of 2000:01–2010:10* 
 
 
 
Interpretation of the model m2 coefficients is as follows: 1% increase of S&P return imply 
0.16% increase of MICEX return, 1% increase of NIKKEI return imply 0.28% increase of MICEX 
return, 1% increase of WTI return imply 0.056% increase of MICEX return, and 1% of MICEX 
return imply 0.081% decrease of the next day MICEX return (overshooting). In our view it is not 
quite correct to compare which variable is more important by using these numbers, because 
variations of returns are different (Table 1). It would be more correct to compare products of the 
returns standard deviations of the corresponding coefficients. Thereby for MICEX, SNP, WTI, 
NIKKEI we have, respectively, –0.0020, 0.0023, 0.0015, 0.0047, which means that NIKKEI has the 
largest impact, next are SNP and MICEX, the last is WTI. Note, that as we will see later, the 
coefficients of the model vary over time and it is not informative to extend these comparisons to the 
whole period. 
From the variance equation we derive that shocks are persistent, since sums 1α γ+  in 
GARCH, or 1 2α α γ+ +  in TGARCH are close to 1. Influence of the time delay  between 
observations is statistically significant and positive: the larger 
tΔ
tΔ  the larger is the uncertainty 2tσ . 
For  contribution of  to the variance is larger than the average contribution of 2tΔ = tΔ 2 1tε −  to the 
variance3. 
A significant positive coefficient 2α  in asymmetric TGARCH models m3, m4, proves that 
negative news adds more volatility then positive news. 
Estimates of the volatility std01–std05 (estimated standard deviations ˆtσ ) with GARCH 
models m1–m5 are not significantly different from one another. Figure 1 presents scatter plots of 
std02–std05 against std01 (almost diagonal), and Figure 2 presents plots of std01–std05 against 
time. 
0.00
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Figure 1. Scatter plots of std02–std05 against std01 
 
                                                 
3 Average value of 2tˆε  is about 0.00056. 
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There are a lot of spikes in the volatility plot (Figure 2). Some of them might be related to 
political news (arrests of Yukos top managers P. Lebedev on July 2, 2003, and M. Khodorkovsky 
on October 25, 2003), some are related to economic news, like Russian “credibility” banking crisis 
in summer, 2004, the largest are related to the international financial crisis which began at the end 
of 2008 in Russia and to the war with Georgia, August 8, 2008. 
Another political event — rough criticism by Russian prime minister V. Putin of Mechel, 
one of the leading Russian companies, on July 24, 2008 — resulted in a collapse of the Russian 
stock market by $58 billions on July 25, 2008: MICEX index dropped by 5.5% and Mechel stocks 
by 29.6%, but that event is not even visible in the Figure 2. 
 
 
4. Estimates of models in rolling windows. 
 
In order to study evolution of the coefficients of equation (1) in time, we make the following 
calculations. For each t  ( ) equation (1) is estimated over the interval 241t > ( 240, )t t− , 
approximately 1 year of observations, and estimated coefficients ( )i tβ , 1,...,5i = ,  
and their standard errors are recorded. As we discussed above we prefer present results for 
“normalized” coefficients, that is, say, 
241,...,2382t =
2( )tβ , the coefficient at S&P return is multiplied by sample 
standard deviation of S&P returns over the interval ( 240,t )t− . The product is denoted 
. The plots of the coefficients _ ( 1nR SnP − ) ( )i tβ  “normalized” in such a way, are presented in 
Figure 3. Plotted are only values of coefficients, statistically significant at 5% level. So long as 
coefficients estimates with OLS and GARCH models produces very similar plots presented are 
results from OLS estimates along with R2 plot (right scale). 
From Figure 3 it is possible to conclude that: first, oil prices (WTI) were significant only 
until the year 2006; second, the previous day return of the Russian index (MICEX) became 
significant only after spring 2006; third, the US index (S&P) was significant in almost all time 
periods before the crisis in August 2008, and after recovering since spring 2010; fourth, the Japan 
index (NIKKEI) was significant during the whole period of observations; fifth, the “degree of 
influence”, measured as “normalized” coefficients, were approximately equal during quiet periods 
for US, Japan, and oil indices and all of them were higher than the influence of the lagged Russian 
index (MICEX). 
Drops in the goodness-of-fit measure (R2) from 0.15 to 0.05 were observed in the period of 
mid-2003–mid-2005. The reason for that discrepancy between Russian and world markets during 
that period is not quite clear. The jump of the goodness-of-fit measure and the “degree of influence” 
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 of the Japan index during the crisis period of
explanation: the reason is high m
8
 2008:10–2009:10 has only a “technical” econometrics 
arket return values and volatility at this period. 
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Figure 2. Evolution of the volatility over time 
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4.1. Estimates of models in rolling windows with “forecasted” indices 
 investors in the Russian stock market are looking not at the previous 
day US
use them in uation (1), wh h then becomes 
 
_  _tR MICEX R MICEX
 
There is some problem of using lagged values of the US indices S&P and WTI in the 
equation (1), because of the long gap between the closing times of the US market at day 1t −  and of 
the Russian market at day t . In that approach some news are not incorporated in US indices. We 
test the following hypothesis:
 returns indices 1 1_ , _t tR SNP R WTI− − , but they use some models to forecast next day values 
_ _ , _ _R SNP f R WTI f , and  eq ict t
1 2 3 4_ _ _ _  _t t t t tR SNP f R WTI f R NIKKEI0 1β β β β β ε− + + + + ,   (2) = +
 
The forecasts could use all informatio
d
r snp r snp r snp r wti r nikkei
n available at the opening time of the Russian stock 
market information. As examples of such mo els for US indices forecasting we have chosen the 
equations: 
 
             0 1 -1 2 -2 3 -1 4t t t t t  _  _  _ _ _= β β β β β+ + + +  
    5 -1 6 -1 _ _t t tr rts r ftse uβ β+ + + ,      (3) 
 
            0 1 -1 2 -2 3 -1 _ _ _ _t t t tr wti r wti r wti r brentindβ β β β= + + +  
  4 -1 5 -1 6 -1 7 -1 _ _ _ _t t t t tr brentind r snp r dji r ftse vβ β β β+ + + + + ,            (4) 
 
where ftse  is FTSE 100 price index, dji  — Dow Jones Industrials price index, brentind  — 
London Brent Crude Oil Index4.  
Again as above we estimate equation (2) in rolling windows of size 241: ( 240, )t t−  
predicted values of _ _ , _ _R SNP f R WTI f  are calculated for each t  from the equations (3) and 
(4), estimated at the intervals ( 50, )t t−  (windows of size 101 also were tested). The results were 
not that good. Predictive power doesn’t increase. Only
t t
 the NIKE and lagged M  
signific
                                                
I ICEX were
ant over the same periods for equation (2). Occasionally forecasted values 
_ _ , _ _t tR SNP f R WTI f   were also significant, but in many cases with the “wrong” (negative) 
sign. 
 
 
 Datastream. 4 FTSE100, LCRINDX, and LCRINDX from
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 5. Rolling window
suppose that all external shocks are 
endogenous (internal) shocks in
political or econom
rolling windows of length 201: 
where 
length 
12
s and event dummy 
 
In this section we study abnormal returns and abnormal volatilities in equation (1). Since we 
absorbed by US, Japan, oil indices, all the rest may be related to 
 the Russian market, which are generated by specific Russian 
ic news. 
We suggest the following procedure. Equation (1) with an additional dummy is estimated in
( 200, )t t− ,  201 2832t< < : 
0 1 1 2 1 3 1 4_  _ _ _  _t t t t tR MICEX R MICEX R SNP R WTI R NIKKEIβ β β β β− − −= + + + + ,  
t teventdummyτ τγ ε+ + ,          (5)
1, ,
0, ,t
L t L
eventdummy
otherwiseτ
τ τ− ≤ ≤ +⎧= ⎨⎩  is the indicator function of the event window of 
2 1L + , with the center at the point τ . The cen  was chosen such that the right 
boundary point of the event window is 10t
ter point
− , that is the event window is placed at the end of the 
rolling window. We tested event windows of size 1, 3, 5, 7. Thus, significant coefficient τγ  
indicates that there is an endogenous shock in Russian index returns on some day around day τ , 
which could not be forecasted by the model (1) estimated on the history of (approximately) 200 
observations. 
Different event windows lengths produce similar results, indicating endogenous shocks at 
the same points in time, the num  the revealed shocks increase with the length of t 
window. Figure 4 presents the results of the LS estimates5 of the equation (5) for the rolling 
( 1)L
ber of  the even
window of length 200 and event window of length 3 = . The points of the plot are es  
values of the coefficient ˆ
timated
τγ , the horizontal axis is time of the event, τ . Statistically s ficant 
values are marked with circles. The triangles mark ukos affair: arrest of P. 
Lebedev, and the next day (July 2–3, 2003), and the arrest of M. Khodorkovsky, and the next day 
(October 25 e largest values of ˆ
igni
the days related to the Y
–26, 2003). There are a lot of shocks, and not necessarily th τγ  are 
statistically significant. Most of the 
The magnified versions of the Figure 4 pl Figure 5 (around Yukos 
arrests), and the Figure 6 (around days related to the Lebedev 
arrest are not significant, four significant points were marked 1 and 2 weeks after the arrest. 
Khodorkovsky’s arrest represents a diffe arked as negative 
significant. In addition there are 5 more negati  two before Khodorkovsky’s 
arrest and 3 after. It looks as if the Russian m ts. 
                                                
shocks are in the pre-crisis period. 
ots are presented at 
beginning of the 2008 crisis). The 
rent situation: the day after the arrest is m
ve significant events —
arket previewed the even
 
5 GARCH estimates provide similar results. 
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Figure 4. Plot of the significant event dummies 
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Figure 5. Yukos arrests 
 
 
0.075
0.100
gamma_tau
significant
-0.100
-0.075
-0.050
-0.025
00.00
0.050
0.025
20
08
-0
6-
01
20
08
-0
6-
15
20
08
-0
6-
29
20
08
-0
7-
13
20
08
-0
7-
27
20
08
-0
8-
10
20
08
-0
8-
24
20
08
-0
9-
07
20
08
-0
9-
21
20
08
-1
0-
05
20
08
-1
0-
19
20
08
-1
1-
02
20
08
-1
1-
16
20
08
-1
1-
30
20
08
-1
2-
14
20
08
-1
2-
28
20
09
-0
1-
11
20
09
-0
1-
25
`
 
Figure 6. The 2008 crisis 
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To find events with significant impact on market volatility we carry out the same procedure 
ating the equation (1), but now we use the TGARCH model m4, including an event 
y directly in the variance equation: 
 
2 2 2 2
0 1 1 2 1 1 1( ) ln( )t t t t t t tind t eventdummyτ τσ α α ε α ε ε γσ δ γ− − − −= + + − + + Δ + .   (6) 
 
Figure 7 presents the results of estimates of the equation (1)-(6) for the rolling window of length
200 and the event window of length 3 ( 1)L = . The points of the plot are estimated values of the 
coefficient τˆγ , the horizontal axis is time of the event, τ . We can see significant outbreaks of
abnormal volatility near to the Yukos arrests and related to the beginning of the 2008 crisis. Most of 
the statistically significant coefficients are negative and are related to news, which decreases the
volatility. Magnified versions of the Figure 7 plots are presented in Figure 8 (around Yukos arrests), 
and Figure 9 (around beginning of the 2008 crisis). One can observe positive shocks
weeks after Lebedev’s arrest and positive shocks around Khodorkovsky’s arrest. e of those 
shocks were before the arrest, it looks like the event was foreseen by the market. Positive shocks in 
volatility related to the 2008 crisis started on August 28, 2008. That could be a m
ent on August 26, that Russia unilaterally recognizes the 
independence of the former Georgian breakaway republics Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
We have found statistically significant influence of oil prices on Russian stock index returns. 
This dependence vanished after 2006. Also the US market index (S&P500) has some predictive 
power for the Russian market index with the exception of the very volatile period during the 2008-
2009 crisis. The Japan index NIKKEI is significant during the whole period of observations, the 
reason is that the Japan ma t one preceding the Russian market in terms of closing 
time, and hence it absorbs the latest news from world markets. 
With moving dummies in the returns equation and in the variance equation we detect 
abnormal endogenous shocks. Some of them could be related to Russian political news, but there 
are many others (even larger in size) that we failed to tie to some political or economic news. This 
confirms the conclusion (Anatolyev, 2005) on structural instability of the Russian financial market. 
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Figure 7. Plot of the significant for the abnormal volatility event dummies 
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Figure 8. Abnormal volatility. Yukos arrests 
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Figure 9. Abnormal volatility. Crisis 
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